[I. De iure civili et naturali.]

1. Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque Romanus partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur. Quae singula qualia sint, suis locis proponemus.

2. Constant autem iura populi Romani ex legibus, plebiscitis, senatus consultis, constitutionibus principum, edictis eorum, qui ius edicendi habent, responsis prudentium. 3. Lex est, quod populus iubet atque constituit. Plebiscitum est, quod plebs iubet atque constituit. Plebs autem a populo eo distat, quod populi appellatione universi cives significantur, connumeratis et patriciis; plebis autem appellatione sine patriciis ceteri cives significantur; unde olim patricii dicebant plebiscitis se non teneri, quia sine auctoritate eorum facta essent; sed postea lex Hortensia lata est, qua cautum est, ut plebiscita universum populum tenerent: Itaque eo modo legibus exaequata sunt.

4. Senatus consultum est, quod senatus iubet atque constituit; idque legis vicem optinet, quamvis [de ea re] fuerit quaesitum. 5. Constitutio principis est, quod imperator decreto vel edicto vel epistula constituit. Nec umquam dubitatum est, quin id legis vicem optineat, cum ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiat.

6. lus autem edicendi habent magistratus populi Romani. Sed amplissimum ius est in edictis duorum praetorum, urbani et peregrini, quorum in provinciis iurisdictionem praesides earum habent; item in edictis aedilium curulium, quorum iurisdictionem in provinciis populi Romani quaestores habent; nam in provincias Caesaris omnino quaestores non mittuntur, et ob id hoc edictum in his provinciis non proponitur. 7. Responsa prudentium sunt sententiae et opiniones eorum, quibus permissum est iura condere. Quorum omnium si in unum sententiae concurrunt, id, quod ita sentiunt, legis vicem optinet; si vero dissentiunt, iudici licet quam velit sententiam sequi; idque rescripto divi Hadriani significatur.

Of the Law of Nations and the Civil Law.

§ 1. All communities of men governed by laws and customs partly use their own particular law and partly that common to all men, for that law which each particular community establishes for itself is peculiar to that community and is called the civil law as being the peculiar law of that community; but that which natural reason establishes between all men is equally maintained by all cornmunities, and is called the law of nations, as being that law which is used by all nations. In this way the Romans use partly their own peculiar law, partly that common to all men. How these distinctions affect our subject we will discuss as occasion arises.

§ 2. The laws of the Romans consist of laws, ordinances of the plebeians, decrees of the senate, the constitutions of the emperors, the edicts of those who have the right of declaring the law, and of the answers of the learned in the law.

§ 3. A law is that which the people orders and establishes. An ordinance of the plebeians is that which the plebeians order and establish. Now the plebeians differ from the people in that by the term people the whole of the citizens are comprehended, including the patricians ; but under the term plebeians the remainder of the citizens, without the patricians, are referred to ; hence formerly the patricians contended that they were not bound by ordinances of the plebeians, for that they were made without their concurrence; but afterwards the Hortensian law was passed, enacting that ordinances of the plebeians should bind the whole people, and in this way they became equal to laws.

§ 4. A decree of the senate is that which the senate orders and establishes, and it has the force of a law, although this has been doubted.

§ 5. A constitution of the emperor is that which the emperor establishes by decree, edict, or rescript, and it has never been doubted that this has the force of a law, since the emperor himself receives his authority by a law.

§ 6. The right of declaring the law is vested in the magistrates o the Roman people, and this right is exercised to its greatest extent in the edicts of the two praetors, viz., the urban praetor and the pr:Ftor for aliens, whose equivalent jurisdiction in the provinces is exercised by the respective governors. A similar right is exercised in the edicts of the curule aediles whose jurisdiction the quaestors have in the provinces assigned to the Roman people ; for quaestors are never sent into the provinces assigned to the emperor, and on that account no publication of this lastmentioned edict takes place in such provinces.

§ 7. The answers of the learned in the law are the decisions and opinions of those who are authorized to settle points of law, and their unanimous decision has the force of a law, though, if they disagree, it is lawful for the judge to follow that decision which he thinks best, as is laid down in a rescript of the late Emperor Hadrian. (Translation by J. Muirhead. The Institutes of Gaius and the Rules of Ulpian. Edinburgh, 1904)